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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
-

v

Case No. 19021

-

VICTOR ONTIVEROS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with
Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value, Utah Code
Ann.,

§

58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty

of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value on January
12, 1983 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable David Sam presiding.

On February

4, 1983, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term not
to exceed five years and fined the sum of $500.00.
<>i

Execution

the sentence was suspended and appellant placed on

probation for a period of eighteen months.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent SCL'ks an orJ<cr of this Cuut·t aff1rm111·1
the verdict and judc1ment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Officer Richard Mack of the Provo Police Department
worked as an undercover officer disguised as a taxi cab driver
in the Springville, Utah area from February through September,
1982 (T. 15).1

Two or three weeks prior to June 10, 1982

(T. 15), Officer Mack was contacted by Billy Roberts (T. 15).
Roberts was unaware of Mack's true identity and had previously
secured drugs for him in his undercover capacity (T. 15).
Roberts told Officer Mack that "he knew where we could get
some drugs" (T. 15) and took him to the home of appellant,
Victor Ontiveros (T. 15).
Although Officer Mack sought initially to purchase
mushrooms (T. 15), appellant replied that he didn't have any
at the time -- that he was dry (T. 17).

Officer Mack asked

when appellant would get some mushrooms or some other drugs.
Appellant said just "later" -- that Mack would need to contact
him at some other time because he was dry (T. 17,53).
Appellant claimed at trial, however, that at the initial
meeting with Mack, "I just told him that I didn't know where

1

To avoid confusion, transcript references refer to the
jury trial on January 12, 1903, while record references
refer to the suppression hearing of November 22, 1982.
-
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any was or I didn't know him, so I just decided I would rather
talk about it"

""t

(R.

59).

Officer Mack testified that his next meeting with
df'l'cllant occurred on June 10 (T. 17.

Appellant and his wife,

however, both contended that Mack returned to appellant's
residence three or four additional times before June 10 (T.
40, 52).

Appellant recalled that Mack requested marijuana at

each of these meetings (R. 59).
response as,

Appellant described his

"I didn't want to sell him any.

where any was.

I didn't know

I didn't know him that good" (R. 59).

At

trial, appellant claimed that he had explained to Mack after
each of his requests that "I didn't sell drugs.
drugs" (T. 40).

I don't do

although appellant admitted to having

previously tried marijuana perhaps three times in his entire
life (T.

46), he still insisted that he had "been clean" since

he was married (T. 47), or after the first six months of
marriage (T. 47), or for a period of at least one and a half
years before June 10, 1982 (T. 47).
Officer Mack made two phone calls to appellant
between their initial meeting and June 10 (T. 17).

Mack

stated that he had asked appellant "if he had got any drugs in
yet and he [appellant] said that he was just checking to see
if

they had come in yet.

.

.

.

He said that he hadn't got it

yet, that for some reason the dealer hadn't got to him yet
•ir I mean his supplier" (T. 18).

On the second phone call,

a{Jpellant again replied "that they hadn't come in yet" (T.
18).

- 3 -

When Officer Mack stopped by appellant's home on
June 10, appellant appeared to have company, although Officer
Mack remembered only seeing a friend of appellant's w1fp
an additional child (T. 19-20).
at the door.

Appellant "iust saw me

[Mark]

He was coming back from the hallway and from the

bedroom area and he saw me and he said,
weed,' and I said •yes' and he said
awhile.'

dnJ

He said,

'I guess you want some

'well come back in

'we are having a party here.'"

(T. 20).

When Officer Mack returned an hour later on June 10,
appellant invited him inside, offered him a beer (T. 20), and
made a call to a number written on a list next to the phone
(T. 50).

Appellant then turned from the phone to quote Mack a

price of $40 per half ounce of marijuana (T. 20-21).

Then,

appellant directed Mack to drive to 1090 West 200 North in
Provo (T. 21).

Upon their arrival, Mack gave appellant $40,

who then exited the car and entered a residence (T. 21).
After five or ten minutes, appellant returned to the car with
a half ounce of marijuana that he gave to Mack (T. 21, 23).
As Mack drove appellant back to his home, appellant
and the officer smoked a joint which had been rolled by
appellant (T. 21, 47).

Appellant then asked Officer Mack "to

sell him enough for a joint out of the baggy.

I

[Mack]

just

told him 'go ahead and take a pinch,' so he took the baggy
himself and took a little pinch" (T. 21}.

Appellant also

remembers smoking the joint and taking the pinch of marijuana
( T. 47).

- 4 -

After dropping appellant back at his home, Officer
was told by appellant "that he would probably get some
""'',l1r1 11>rns

in this weekend and I

[officer) said 'I want some,•

"'cl with that I left" (T. 21-22).

Officer Mack did not follow

throuyh on appellant's offer to sell mushrooms (T. 27).
On January 12, 1983, the jury was convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of distribution of
a controlled substance for value.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED INTO
DISTRIBUTING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR
VALUE.
Appellant contends as a defense to the charge of
distribution of a controlled substance for value that he was
entrapped as defined in Utah Code Ann.,
amended.

§

76-2-303 (1953), as

However, in compliance with the objective test for

entrapment, Officer Mack's conduct did not induce appellant to
commit such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would
be effective to persuade an average person, other than one who
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offense.
Appellant made a written motion claiming entrapment
as a defense on November 22, 1982 (T. 12), at least ten days
before the date of trial, January 12, 1983, as required by
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-2-303(4)

(1953), as amended.

Appellant's

m11tion to dismiss by reason of entrapment was denied on
December l, 1982 ( T. 17).

Although a jury instruction on
-
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entrapment was given (#8, R. 24), appellant was nonetheless
found guilty of distribution of a controlled substance for
value (R. 33).
Entrapment is recognized as a defensP in Utah Code
Ann., § 76-2-303(1)

(1953), as amended:

It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting
in co-operation with the officer induces
the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it.
Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit on offense does not constitute
entrapment.
Utah had traditionally adopted the subjective test of
entrapment as exemplified in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148,
369 P. 2d 494, 496 ( 1962).

The subjective test asked ( 1)

whether there was an inducement and (2) if so, whether the
defendant showed any predisposition to commit the offense.2
Although Pacheco, supra was construed initially as consistent
with the passage in 1973 of§ 76-2-303(1),3 this Court later
recognized that the explicit wording of § 76-2-303(1)
incorporates an objective standard of entrapment.

State v.

Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979).

2

The subjective test is adopted in Sorrells v. U.S., 287
U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); see generally:
62 A.LR. 3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of the Law Concerning
Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense -- State Cases,
§ 2(a), p. 114.

3

State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975).
- 6 -

The objective test focuses not on the predisposition
ut
111

the defendant, but "on whether the police conduct revealed
the

Pd

l 1ngs

rt icular case falls below standards, to which common
respond, for the proper use of governmental power."

Id. at 500.

The test to determine an unlawful entrapment

examines whether the officer "induced the defendant to commit
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be
effective to persuade an average person, other than one who
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offenses."
at 503.

Id.

Examples of prohibited police conduct are "extreme

pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on
sympathy, pity or close personal friendship or offers of
inordinate sums of money."

Taylor, supra, at 503; Grossman v.

State, 457 P.2d 226-230 (Alaska 1969).
Appellant's case law is not despositive of the facts
of this case.

Officer Mack did not initially contact

appellant at random.

Instead, appellant was introduced by

Billy Roberts as one who could obtain drugs.

This effectively

distinguishes State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621 P.2d 1238 (1980)
where the undercover officer working at a marina on Lake
Powell approached the defendant and offered to buy drugs
without any information that the defendant had ever previously
sold drugs.

"When it is known or suspected that a person is

engaged in criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is
not entrapment to provide an opportunity for such a person to
rctrry out his criminal intentions."

- 7 -

State v. Curtis, Utah,

542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975).

Roberts'

introduction of appellant

provided Officer Mack with a suspicion that appellant sold
drugs, justifying Mack in providing appellant an opportunity
to carry out his criminal intentions.
Although Mack did initiate each of his four contacts
with appellant, the officer did so based on appellant's
representations that he would be receiving drugs.

Such

conduct is also distinguishable from that of the Kourbelas,
supra, officer who followed the defendant back to Salt Lake
City, initiated contact again after a two-week silence by
defendant, and followed up five times.

Officer Mack contacted

appellant three times before the sale, once at home and twice
with phone calls.

Each of the first three encounters ended

with appellant saying that he had not yet received the drugs,
not that he desired to terminate his relationship with the
officer.

Officer Mack's contacts were not so frequent or high

pressured as to induce the normal person to secure him drugs.
State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979),

involved

entrapment by a police agent who was defendant's lover and who
was suffering through heroin withdrawal.

Especially given the

defendant's former addiction, the lover's extreme emotional
pleas were all the more manipulative.

In contrast, Officer

Mack in the instant case was merely a potential buyer in
relation to appellant.

There were no pleas of desperate

illness, close friendship, or inordinate sums of money.

On

the contrary, appellant fixed the price of the marijuana by

- 8 -

contacting his supplier (T. 20-21).

Appellant's off-hand

'<1>lanat ion of why he invited Mack to return on June 10 was:
"l'hen more or less to get him out of my hair, I just called
Lhis guy that I met" (T. 41).

The officer's conduct was

merely persistent enough to gain appellant's confidence, but
was not a badgering or manipulation of appellant analogous to
tile addict girlfriend's conduct in Taylor, supra.
The subjective test applied in State v. Sorouskirn,
Utah, 571 P.2d 1370 (1977) has been rejected.
499.

Taylor, supra,

Even if the facts of Sorouskirn constituted entrapment

on the objective standard, they are distinguishable because
the agent in Sorouskirn had infiltrated a college dormitory,
thrown free pot parties and brought peer pressure to bear on
defendant.

Although likely to distribute a controlled

substance, the defendant was entrapped by such police conduct
into distributing a controlled substance for value.

The agent

drove the defendant to the point of sale, importuned the
defendant to purchase the marijuana from a reluctant seller,
and importuned the defendant to return for two additional
bags.

Id. at 1371.

Appellant invited Officer Mack to return

after the party, gave directions to the supplier's residence,
and made the purchase without further efforts by Officer Mack.
The conduct of the undercover agent in Sorouskirn, supra, was
of a more extensive and qualitatively different sort than the
conduct of Officer Mack.
The trial court had tried to find Sorouskirn guilty
of distribution of a controlled substance for value charge.

- 9 -

In refusing to split hairs in that way,

the Court held thal

the entrapment extended to the defendant's "pinchincJ" ot

the

mariiuana baggie secured for the undercover agent.
Sorouskirn, supra, 1371.

This dicta of the Sorouskirn Court

should not be confused with a defense of agency explicitly
prohibited by Utah Code Ann.,

§

58-37-2(6),

(8)

(1953), as

amended:
(6)
The word "deliver" or "delivery"
means the actual, constructive, or
attempted transfer of a controlled
substance, whether or not there exists an
agency relat1onsh1p.

* * *
(8)
The word "distribute" means to
deliver a controlled substance.
[Emphasis added.]
State v. Casias, Utah,

567 P.2d 1097 (1917)4 found the

defendant guilty of distributing a controlled substance for
value,

§

58-37-B(l)(a)(ii), despite defendant's contention

that he was merely an agent of the undercover agent.
1099.

Id.

Neither the quoted language of Sorouskirn, supra, on

agency, nor the facts of that case argue that appellant was
entrapped.
In summary, Officer Mack's conduct did not entrap
appellant because of the following factual circumstances:

4

Although Casias, supra, applies a subjective test of
entrapment now discarded in Utah, the Casias ruling on
agency in connection with the Utah Controlled Substances
Act was not overrulled.
- 10 -

1.

The initial contact was made through a friend of
appellant who described appellant as one who
could obtain drugs for Officer Mack;

2.

The officer initiated further contacts because
he understood from appellant that appellant
would be receiving drugs; and

3.

Appellant admitted to using drugs in the past;
that he didn't make any sale on the first three
contacts because he didn't trust the officer;
and that by the fourth contact appellant
instructed the agent to come back in an hour,
which the agent did, and the sale was completed.

The conduct of Officer Mack conforms to the
objective test for entrapment.

Four contacts over the course

of three weeks were not such a persuasion or inducement as to
persuade an average person, other than one who was merely
given the opportunity to distribute a controlled substance for
value.

Any undercover effort to gain the confidence of a

distributor would be effectively thwarted by a rule which
found entrapment merely from multiple contacts initiated by
the undercover officer.

The nature of the contacts, their

frequency, and the officer's rationale for pursuing contacts
with appellant in a specific manner are all relevant to
assessing the officer's conduct on the objective test of
''"LL"Fwe11L.

Appellant has shown no undue pressure or such

unfair conduct by Officer Mack as to constitute entrapment.
The officer's contacts were of such a nature as to merely
offer appellant the opportunity to distribute a controlled
substance for value.

Therefore, appellant was not entrapped.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TU SUPPORT A
CONVICTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE.
Appellant contends that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that he received value from the marijuana
distribution.

Consequently, appellant claims he is guilty,

if

at all, not of distributing a controlled substance for value,
Utah Code Ann,.§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)

(1953), as amended, but of

arranging the distribution of a controlled substance for
value, Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv)

(1953), as amended.

However, appellant raises an improper defense of agency and
clearly both distributed the marijuana and received value for
the distribution.
The standard for appellate review on insufficient
evidence is stated in State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443
( 1983):
We review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of
the jury.
we reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
Id. at 444, see State v. Kereckes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168
(1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231

(1980).

The

evidence presented at trial was clearly sufficient by the
Petree, supra, standard to establish the elements of
distributing a controlled substance for value.
- 12 -

The statutory provisions at issue under Utah Code
Ann., § 58-37-8(a) state:
(a)
Except as authorized by this act, it
shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly and intentionally:
(ii) To distribute for value or
possess with intent to distribute for
value a controlled or counterfeit
substance;

* * *

(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or
arrange to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance for value or to
negotiate to have a controlled
substance distributed or dispensed
for value and distribute, disperse,
or negotiate the distribution or
dispensing of any other liquid,
substance, or material in lieu of the
specific controlled substance so
offered, agreed, consented, arranged,
or negotiated.
A defendant may be guilty of the arranging provision,

§

58-37-8(l){a){iv), without receiving value for his act of
arranging.

State v. Harrisson,5 Utah, 601 P.2d 922 (1979).

As long as the seller receives value for the distribution, a
defendant has arranged a distribution for value.
A defendant is guilty of distributing for value,

Id. at 924.
§

58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), if he (a) distributes, and (b) receives
value.

Appellant both distributed and received value in the

sale of marijuana to Officer Mack.
Appellant received $40 from Officer Mack before
exiting the taxi and entering the supplier's residence

S Appellant at p. 8 refers to State v. Harris with the
correct cite for State v. Harrisson.
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21).

Officer Mack testified that given the varying prices of

marijuana of different qualities, and the quality of the
received marijuana, that appellant could have received a
profit from the $40 price (T. 121).

Further, Appellant not

only shared a joint with Mack on the return trip, but was
allowed to retain a pinch of marijuana for himself (T. 115).
Appellant's offer to purchase the pinch (T. 42, 115) shows its
monetary value.

Thus, appellant received value from the

distribution.
Appellant also distributed the marijuana in
obtaining possession from the supplier and retaining
possession until his delivery of it to Officer Mack in the
taxi.

Under Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-2(8)

(1953), as amended,

"The word 'distribute' means to deliver a controlled
substance."

As defined in Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-2(6), "The

word 'deliver' or 'delivery' means the actual, constructive,
or attempted transfer of a controlled substance, whether or
not there exists an agency relationship."

Appellant

transferred the marijuana from the supplier to Officer Mack.
The dicta of State v. Sorouskirn, Utah, 571 P.2d
1370, 1371 (1977) indicated that because the defendant was
entrapped with regard to distribution for value that there was
no separate offense of mere distribution of a controlled
substance on the facts of that case.

The entrapment of

Sorouskirn, supra, does not stand for the proposition that
defendants have available an agency defense under the Utah

- 14 -

Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-8 (1953),
amended.

See State v. Casias, Utah, 567 P.2d 1097 (agency

n•)t determinative in finding criminal culpability under the
Utah
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction for distribution of a
controlled substance, Utah Code Ann.,

s

58-37-8(a)(ii) (1953),

as amended, should be affirmed.
First, appellant was not entrapped by undercover
Officer Mack.

The undercover officer's conduct conforms to

the objective test for entrapment in that it was not such
persuasion or inducement as to persuade an average person,
other than one who was merely given the opportunity to
distribute a controlled substance for value.
Second, the evidence was sufficient to support a
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance for
value.

Appellant both distributed and received value when he

took $40 from Officer Mack, procurred the marijuana, gave the
marijuana to the officer and then smoked a joint with the
officer and retained a pinch of marijuana for personal use.
This Court should affirm the verdict and judgment of
the trial court in appellant's trial for distribution of a
controlled substance for value.
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